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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
lear progress is needed in order to fully realise the benefits of the Single Market
in the area of corporate taxation. If the EU aspires to become the “most
competitive economy in the world” by 2010, as agreed by EU leaders in Lisbon
in 2000, corporate tax reform should become a priority on the political agenda.
EU-led harmonisation has affected many sectors, but corporate taxation has not been
among the beneficiaries. The jungle of EU member state tax systems hinders
competitiveness of European industry, big and small, through high compliance costs,
double taxation and protectionist regulations. It also reduces the pressure on European
tax administrations to adapt.
The formal adoption of the European Company Statute (ECS) by the EU Council makes
coordinated European progress in this area even more important. The ECS will allow
single incorporation for firms in the EU, single governance and single reporting
structures, but in the absence of a tax leg, it may not change much for cross-border
business in the EU. Moreover, there is a danger that member states will grant special tax
regimes to these European Companies (Societas Europaea in Latin; or SEs as they are
called) in an uncoordinated way, as has already been suggested in certain capitals. This
would be counterproductive indeed.
In a recent communication, the European Commission outlined the contours for a more
coordinated tax policy in the EU. The Commission proposes immediate action in a
series of well-defined areas, and is initiating a debate on a set of wider comprehensive
measures with the objective of providing EU business with a single corporate tax base.
EU member states seem to be lukewarm about further progress in this area, however,
and the basis for rapid action is not there. Decisive support from business is therefore
needed. Overall, a more harmonised tax system should improve fairness, efficiency,
simplicity and transparency for operators. It should reduce the home bias and render
investment decisions more efficient, which should contribute to overall economic
effectiveness and welfare.
Although the evidence is limited, the cost of compliance with the tax rules amounts to
about 2-4% of total corporate tax revenues raised. Assuming that these figures hold true
for the EU as a whole, the cost of the current complexity would fall in the range of
€4.3bn (2%) to €8.6bn (4%). This figure may still underestimate the cost of compliance
with 15 different systems in the EU.
To gain momentum towards EU corporate tax reform, we propose the following steps:
• The EU Council should set a timetable for EU corporate tax reform in a Corporate
Tax Action Plan. This schedule should categorise and prioritise the different policy
steps, with deadlines established for adoption and implementation by the member
states. By 2010, a new regime should be in place.
• Immediate action should be undertaken to adapt the current EU corporate tax
directives to include the European Company Statute. In a second step, the 1992
merger directive should be extended to further ease cross-border restructuring of
corporations.
CEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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• A process should be set in motion for moving towards an optional corporate tax base
either through Home State Taxation or Common Base Taxation. This requires
agreement by the member states on the definition of groups of companies and on
some formula to apportion profits. It also requires study of the related administrative
implications.
• The Convention on the Future of Europe should attack the institutional problems
underlying the lack of progress in taxation, notably by extending qualified majority
voting in the tax domain. Enlargement will otherwise render any progress in the tax
domain at EU level virtually impossible.
The coming into force of the European Company Statute provides a unique opportunity
to develop a more coordinated European corporate tax system. Failure to act now will
most likely hold back future progress as the EU devotes more of its energy to
enlargement.
Corporate Tax Action Plan
Timing Proposal Advantages Deadline
Long-term Common Tax Base Transparency
Efficiency
Effectiveness
Medium-term Home State Taxation Politically feasible
Simplification compared to status
quo
2010
Lisbon
target
Optional Common Base
Taxation
Politically feasible
Deliberate step to a Common Tax
Base
2010
Lisbon
target
Short-term Adapt parent/subsidiary and
merger directives to existence
of ECS
Include SEs in the list of applicable
entities
2003
Improve implementation of
current directives
Make effects more visible 2003
Expand scope of merger
directive
Ease cross-border restructuring
(transfer of assets, cross-border loss
compensation)
2003
Harmonise intra-EU terms of
tax treaties in the EU, and
move to common EU-rest of
world model
Adapts tax treaties to reality of the
EU and reduces tax planning.
2005
Immediate Coordinate implementation of
the ECS
Ensure that the benefits of the ECS
materialise
Now
Adoption of the draft
interest/royalty directive
Harmonise tax treatment of
transfers between associated
companies
Now
Ratification of the
prolongation of the
Arbitration Convention
Orderly resolution of disputes in the
area of transfer pricing
Now
Prolongation of the Code of
Conduct beyond 2002
Ensure continuation of attempts to
dismantle harmful tax practices
Now1
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INTRODUCTION
Tax harmonisation has decisively returned to the agenda of the European Commission,
and is now viewed as one of the main outstanding issues for a well functioning Single
Market. After years of substantial neglect by the member states and deadlock in the EU
Council, Commissioner Mario Monti achieved considerable progress in the discussions
and managed to reconcile the divergent interests of the member states under the
“harmful tax competition” approach. As a result, member states have started to discuss
corporate tax matters on a multilateral basis and to meet regularly to evaluate their
respective tax systems. Moreover, at the Feira European Council (June 2000), an
agreement was reached on the principles of the savings taxation directive, which takes
the exchange of information between tax administrations as its basis. Momentum has
been created, and it is now highly unlikely that the dossier could ever return to the
sterility that characterised the debate in the mid-1990s.
In the meantime, progress has also been realised on two separate, but not unrelated
dossiers, the decision to move to International Accounting Standards (IAS) for all EU
listed corporations, and the agreement on the European Company Statute (ECS). By
2005, all EU listed corporations should move to IAS as the accounting standard, thereby
creating a single European standard. The agreement on the European Company (known
by its Latin name of Societas Europaea and abbreviated SE) will allow a single
incorporation for EU firms, reducing the cost and burden of having to comply with
different company law regimes. Combined, these three elements could radically ease the
way of doing business in Europe, but they are interdependent, and failure to achieve
progress on one may make the other two much less attractive.
Probably the most uncertain element at this stage is corporate taxation. Member state
tax systems are widely heterogeneous, and a more common European tax system will
only be possible as a result of comprehensive European tax reform. So far, EU
initiatives in the area of corporate taxation are limited to eliminating harmful tax
regimes in the member states. The concept of an EU corporate tax system is beginning
to take shape, but the thinking is still in a very preliminary phase. Broadly speaking,
experts see two possibilities: Home State Taxation (HST) or Optional Common Base
Taxation (CBT). Both proposals would allow companies to compute their EU profits
under a single set of rules (rather than under 15 different rules as at present) and to
apportion those profits EU-wide to be taxed in the individual member states. But both
HST and CBT require agreement by the member states on the definition of a group of
companies and a uniform formula to apportion profits, which raises a number of
complex questions. This will most likely not be in place for the entry into force of the
European Company Statute in 2004, but it should not hinder all those concerned to start
preparations as soon as possible.
The benefits of more tax coordination are clear. The purpose of this paper is to discuss
the “ideal” corporate tax scenario for the EU and to calculate its cost and benefits for
business and public administrations (Sections II and III, respectively). Section ILANNOO & LEVIN
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provides an overview of corporate taxation in the EU, and Section IV offers a brief
conclusion.
I. BACKGROUND
All member states in the EU and most other countries in the world tax company profits.
This is a matter of some controversy. It goes without saying that corporations fulfil an
important economic role and, as only individuals and not companies can bear taxes, the
taxes that companies do pay will be passed on in the form of higher prices or lower
payments for inputs (labour, capital, etc.). The question can therefore be asked why
states tax them. The justifications for corporate taxes are manifold. Corporate taxes can
be seen as benefit taxes, i.e. corporations pay for the public services they use as a
company (e.g. infrastructure). Another argument in favour of taxing corporations is that
it would otherwise create incentives for individuals to accumulate income in
corporations in order to avoid paying tax. Corporate taxation has also been defended as
a rent tax. The aim is then to capture the economic benefits that the owner of fixed
factors earns (Mintz, 1996).
A corporate tax is levied on the “taxable profits” of a company, i.e. the difference
between the revenues of a company and its expenses, as ascertained through the
company accounts. There are, however, significant differences between countries in the
way taxable profits are calculated and the level of corporate taxation.
This section begins with a description of the inherent differences in tax policy in the
EU, where taxation largely falls within the competence of the member states. It
evaluates the adverse economic effects of maintaining taxation along national lines in
the EU’s Single Market. Finally, it presents what the EU has done up to this date to
address these adverse effects.
1. The current corporate tax situation in the EU
The EU’s member states retain full control over the formulation and implementation of
corporate tax policy. Tax policy in general has been regarded as a basic prerogative of
national sovereignty and thus not the object of any Community competence.
1 There are
thus 15 different tax systems in the EU. Each member state must, however, exercise its
national competence in corporate tax matters in a manner that is consistent with the
various “freedoms” established by the EC Treaty (e.g. freedom of establishment). The
fact that the European Court of Justice is hearing an increasing number of tax cases is an
indication of the frictions that exist between the two. But its decisions do not necessarily
lead to more convergence among tax rates.
Over the last two decades, nominal corporate rates have decreased in the EU, and the
practice of multiple tax rates is disappearing. Nevertheless, there continue to be wide
differences between the rates. For example, in 2001 tax rates varied between 10%
(Ireland) and 39% (Belgium). See Table 1 below.
                                               
1  Some indirect taxes, such as VAT, fall within Community competence and have thus been the subject
of EU legislation.AN EU COMPANY WITHOUT AN EU TAX?
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Table 1. Corporate income tax rates in the EU and US (%)
1980 1985 1990 1994 1997 1998 1999 2001
BE 48 45 43 40.17 41.17 40.17
 a 39 39
DK 37 50 40 34 34 34 32 30
DE 61.7-44.3 61.7-44.3 50-36 45-30 45-30 45-30
b 40
 c 25
ES 33 33 35 35 35 35-30
d 35 35
GR 49 49 46 40 40 40-35
e 40 37.5
FR 50 50 37-42 33 36.6-41.6 36.6-41.6
f 33.33 33.33
IE 45 50-10 43-10 40-10 36-10 32-10
g 10
h 10
IT 36.3 47.8 47.8 52.2 53.2 31.2-41.2
 i 37 36
LU 45.5 45.5 39.4 33.3 32 32 30 30
NL 46 42 35 35 35 35 35 35
AU 61.5-38.3
 j 61.5-38.3 61.5-38.3 34 34 34 34 34
PT 51.2-44 51.2-44 39.6 39.6 39.6 37.4 34 32
FI 50 50 40 25 28 28 28 29
SE 40 52 52 28 28 28 28 28
UK 52 40 35 33 31 31 30 30
US 35 35
a A rate of 39% with a surtax of 3%.
b The ordinary rates are 45% (undistributed profits) and 30% for distributed profits, there is a solidarity
contribution of 5%.
c For distributed profits, the corporation tax rate is reduced to 30% and the statutory tax rate to 43.65%
d The rate of 30% is reduced for small enterprises.
e 35% for listed non-financial companies.
f The ordinary rate is 33.3%, the surtax of 10% (15% for large enterprises).
g 10% is the preferential rate for Shannon airport.
h General available tax rate for the manufacturing sector. The general corporation tax rate for other sectors
such as services is 28% and considered in the sensitivity analysis.
i The first rate is the lower for the manufacturing sector. The general corporation tax rate for other sectors
such as services is 28% and considered in the sensitivity analysis.
j The first rate applies to undistributed profits, the second to distributed profits.
Source: European Commission (2001).
The various methods member states apply to calculate taxable profits differ in many
respects, both for domestic and foreign income. Differences in the calculation of
domestic income may be due to, among other things, different accounting systems,
different treatment of dividends received from other companies, different treatment of
capital gains or losses and different treatment of depreciation. The calculation of income
differs due, for example, to the existence of special regimes concerning particular
sectors of the economy, particular economic activities or particular regions.
2 Once all
these differences are taken into account, a very different picture emerges. This is partly
captured by calculating the effective tax rates a company faces in a particular member
state.
                                               
2 Bond et al. (2000).LANNOO & LEVIN
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Effective tax rates are generally lower than the nominal rates (see Table 2). Moreover,
the divergence between the countries is lower when measuring effective rates as
compared to nominal rates. Nevertheless, the difference between effective and nominal
rates has decreased over the years. This is a reflection of the convergence of the
underlying tax base, meaning that the effective rate is increasingly determined by the
nominal rate.
Table 2. Effective average tax rates (EATR) and corporate income tax rates (CITR)
 in the EU (1999-2001)
EATR (1999) CITR (1999) CITR-
EATR
EATR (2001) CITR (2001) CITR-
EATR
BE 34.5 39 4.5 34.5 39 4.5
DK 28.8 32 3.2 27.3 30 2.7
DE 39.1 40 0.9 34.9 25 -9.9
ES 31 35 4 31 35 4
GR 29.6 40 10.4 28 37.5 9.5
FR 37.5 33.3 -4.2 34.7 33.3 -1.4
IE 10.5 10 -0.5 10.5 10 -0.5
IT 29.8 37 7.2 27.6 36 8.4
LU 32.2 30 -2.2 32.2 30 -2.2
NL 31 35 4 31 35 4
AU 29.8 34 4.2 27.9 34 6.1
PT 32.6 34 1.4 30.7 32 1.3
FI 25.5 28 2.5 26.6 29 2.4
SE 22.9 28 5.1 22.9 28 5.1
UK 28.2 30 1.8 28.3 30 1.7
EU average
a 29.5 32.4 2.8 28.5 30.9 2.4
a Average is indicative only.
Source: European Commission/Eurostat (2001).
In sum, while nominal tax rates have decreased, EU governments have widened the tax
base (see Figure 1 below). In other words, the discrepancy between taxable profits and
real economic profits has decreased (Lodin, 2001). The latest example of this general
trend is Germany, which in 2000 decided to fundamentally change its corporate tax
system.
3 While the overall effect on the effective tax burden has been limited, national
tax systems have tended to become more transparent, less distorting and less costly to
comply with.
                                               
3 German tax rates (split rates) went down from over 40% to a single rate of 25%. The base is broadened
by tightening the criteria for accelerated depreciation, increasing the time of amortisation of assets and
reducing the depreciation of business buildings. For further analysis of the German tax reform, see Lodin
(2001) and Rädler (2000).AN EU COMPANY WITHOUT AN EU TAX?
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Figure 1. Tax dichotomy: Lower but broader
2. Consequences of the current situation
The diverse tax picture that emerges from the preceding discussion may be attractive to
for those who favour subsidiarity and national sovereignty. In the EU there is indeed a
relatively broad political consensus that tax policy falls within the competence of
member states, not the Community. As economic integration has deepened and
widened, however, it has become increasingly clear that national tax rules create
obstacles to achieving a true Single Market.
This section evaluates the effects of this discrepancy between national tax rules and
economic integration. It focuses on the question whether national tax policies will lead
to a race to the bottom, whether they may lead to a shift in the tax burden, whether they
may create economic distortions and what kinds and levels of costs it imposes on
society.
The effects of tax competition on tax levels
States compete among themselves to attract economic activity. One of the instruments
by which they compete is taxes. Concern has been expressed, however, that by
maintaining national tax sovereignty in times when economic activity is highly mobile
that states may excessively compete with each other for the location of economic
activity and thus not be able to finance an optimal level of providing public goods. It is
asserted that such tax competition could lead to a “race to the bottom” in tax rates or
revenues.
The claim that tax competition may be harmful is contentious, however. Many
economists tend to regard tax competition as beneficial. It ensures that taxes are
efficiently used and puts a downward pressure on the price, in this case tax levels.
Moreover, there is a legitimate case for differences in taxation between countries, as
Tax rate
Narrow Broad
High
Low
Tax base
• EC 1980
• EU 2001LANNOO & LEVIN
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countries have different preferences over the level and type of taxation. Indeed, in a
seminal article on tax competition, Charles Tiebout stated that societies desire different
levels of public services and therefore are prepared to pay different taxes optimal
(Tiebout, 1956). An international tax system that allows a company to locate in one
country because this country provides a level of public services to its liking is thus
optimal. Is tax competition therefore always beneficial according to Tiebout’s logic?
Tiebout’s assumption only holds if the companies benefit from less public service if
they go to a low-tax jurisdiction. However, the problem with the flurry of special
regimes targeting specific sectors or activities is that companies that benefit from lower
taxes continue to benefit from a high level of public services (Ani-Yoanh, 2000).
Empirical evidence of a race to the bottom is limited. As has been depicted above, there
has indeed been a general decrease in the nominal and effective corporate tax rates, but
this has not affected tax revenues. As can be seen from the figure below, EU member
states’ total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP increased until the mid-1980s and
have since remained stable at around 40%.
Figure 2. Total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, 1965-1997
Source: OECD (2000).
Effects on the distribution of the tax burden
If the problem is not one of a collapse in revenues, then it might be a shift in the
distribution of the tax burden. While corporate tax revenues as part of total tax revenues
have remained stable over time, it is often claimed that labour has come to carry more
of the tax burden.
4 Apart from any equity argument that the tax burden should be more
evenly borne by labour and capital, the increased taxation of labour would hamper
employment creation as it increases the cost of labour. This argument needs, however,
to be qualified.
                                               
4 See for example OECD (1998) and CEPS (2000).
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Figure 3. Different taxes as a share of total taxation in the EU
Source: OECD (2000).
Figure 4. Different taxes as a share of GDP in the EU
Source: OECD (2000).
As can be seen from the figures above, labour yields substantially more tax revenues
than corporations.
5 However, the difference, which increased markedly until 1975, has
since remained stable, or even decreased. This would imply a refutation of the argument
of a wide shift of the tax burden towards labour. However, if one looks at another
measure of taxation, a different picture emerges. The effective tax burden on capital has
decreased from 45 to 35% between 1981 and 1996. During the same time, the effective
tax burden on labour has increased from 35 to 42%.
6
                                               
5 There are several problems with the statistics however. For example, the measure for labour taxation –
personal income – includes taxation of personal capital income.
6 Lautenberg (1999). Capital taxes, however, are borne both by individuals and companies. It is therefore
not conclusive evidence of a shift in burden.
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The most marked change, however, has been in social security contributions. Revenues
from social security contributions have increased from 6.3% of GDP in 1965 to 11.4%
in 1998 (from 22.8 to 27.8% as share of total taxation). The reasons behind this increase
can be found in pressures on welfare states as a result of higher unemployment, ageing
populations and increasing spending on healthcare. But employers have come to carry
the large bulk of these contributions, while the share of employees – having increased
since 1965 – have decreased since 1995.
Figure 5. Social security charges
Source: OECD (2000).
The variations in taxation may not necessarily be a result of corporate tax competition.
There are various possible explanations of the increasing gap between personal and
corporate income taxation in the 1970s. Since the statistics are based on tax revenues, it
is likely that the rise in personal income taxation was caused by the rapid inflation of the
1970s (i.e. revenues in nominal numbers increased). At the same time, corporate income
taxes remained constant in nominal terms, and decreased in real terms, as stagflation in
the wake of the oil price shocks depressed corporate profits. It may also be a pro-active
and perfectly rational choice by governments in open economies to tax mobile factors
less and immobile factors more (IFS, 2000).
Distortions to economic behaviour
The ambition for the EU’s Single Market is that national borders should play no role in
the decision of where to invest. As long as corporate taxes remain national, however,
divergences in the effective tax levels remain large. Therefore, the investment decisions
of companies remain affected by tax considerations: the effective tax burden depends on
the home country of the parent company and the location of foreign affiliates. The result
may be that investments become more and more tax driven, i.e. they take place in the
lowest tax jurisdiction, not the lowest cost jurisdiction.
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Tax arbitrage
The current situation, characterised by 15 different tax systems in the EU, offers
corporations plenty of opportunities to “shop around” for the best effective tax rate. The
extent of tax arbitrage depends on the mobility of corporate investment. Although it is
often claimed that all factors of production are entirely mobile in today’s globalised
world, there are reasons not to overstate the argument. Mobility is increasing but there
are still several factors that continue to hamper it. Physical installations such as factories
are not that easy to move, for example. In addition, there are reasons other than taxes
why companies tend to favour a particular location, e.g. proximity to the market, well-
adapted regulations, stable and predictable political climate, etc.
Nevertheless, it has become increasingly easy to move financial capital. There are
already policy measures that are supposed to prevent tax arbitrage: there are rules
governing how companies should count the value of transfers between the different
entities of a company group (transfer pricing rules). In principle these transactions
should be priced on an arms-length basis, i.e. the value a company attributes to an
internal transaction should reflect the current market value of a similar transaction
between two independent companies. Nation states have also developed a vast number
of bilateral double taxation treaties, intended to eliminate double taxation, but also to
counter international tax planning and avoidance.
Compliance costs
Even though the continued existence of 15 different tax systems offers opportunities to
companies to minimise their taxes, tax planning comes at a cost, as it is time-consuming
and complicated. It also risks diverting the attention of companies from profitability to
tax minimisation (Lodin, 2001). The time spent by senior management on tax issues
instead of other issues directly related to the operating of the company represents a huge
hidden cost. The activity of tax planning is unproductive and economically inefficient.
Assessments of compliance costs are difficult to make. For the UK it has been measured
that compliance costs amount to 2.2% of a company’s income tax revenues (European
Commission, 2001). In the Netherlands, compliance costs have been found to make up
4% of total tax revenues (ibid.). The Ruding Report (European Commission, 1992) also
assessed compliance costs. More than 85% of the companies participating in the
report’s survey estimated that compliance costs represented 3% of their company’s total
income. The Ruding Report and later surveys have also found that compliance costs are
particularly burdensome for SMEs.
***
Overall, the problems presented above are becoming increasing important as European
economic integration proceeds. With the launch of the euro, yet another obstacle to
cross-border activity has been removed and this is likely to propel more European
companies to enter European markets other than their home country. Thus, more and
more companies will suffer from the remaining aspects of fragmentation, such as tax.
The next section presents what the EU has done so far to try to alleviate the negative
effects of taxation along national lines.LANNOO & LEVIN
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3. Developments in EU tax policy
 Harmonisation of direct taxation has been one of the least successful parts of the Single
Market programme. To date, only two harmonising measures, the parent/subsidiary and
the merger directives, and a Tax Arbitration Convention, have been agreed, whereas
other proposals have been stalled or were withdrawn. The adoption of the tax policy
package by the December 1997 EU Council of Finance Ministers (Ecofin) signalled a
change of track: namely, the EU would focus on tax coordination, rather than
harmonisation, and it would link the different elements in a tax package: savings
taxation, harmful tax measures and a revised interest and royalties directive. This
change of track has been successful in reviving the debate on tax issues,
7 but the
package approach remains a drawback. Progress can only be achieved simultaneously
across the different components of the package.
 The Single Market programme
 The 1992 programme in the area of direct taxation produced two directives and a tax
Arbitration Convention, while several other proposals had to be abandoned. The two
directives deal with the abolition of double taxation of enterprises operating on a cross-
border basis in the EU. The parent/subsidiary directive (90/435/EEC) exempts
dividends paid between associated companies from taxation; the merger directive
(90/434/EEC) eases cross-border company restructuring operations from a fiscal
perspective. While both directives have proven useful, they are fairly narrow, and
earlier attempts by the European Commission in 1993 to expand their scope failed.
Moreover, implementation by the member states has been problematic.
8 The Arbitration
Convention created a mechanism for the settlement of disputes between enterprises.
9
Another significant element in the earlier attempts to proceed with tax harmonisation
was the 1992 Ruding Committee Report. This Committee, set up by the European
Commission to give a new impetus to tax harmonisation, concluded that differences in
corporate taxation distorted the functioning of the internal market. It argued for a
minimum corporate tax rate of 30% in the EU, coupled with a series of measures in
three phases designed to produce significant convergence in company tax systems.
Member states showed no desire, however, to take these steps or even to continue
discussion on corporate tax measures.
                                               
7 The Commission now even has a special web page devoted to corporate tax reform
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/index.htm).
8 See European Commission (2001, pp. 225-242) for a detailed discussion of the working of the
directives.
9 Convention on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of profits of
associated enterprises (90/436/EEC). The extension of the Convention to Austria, Finland and Sweden is
still pending ratification in some member states, as also does its prolongation, having formally expired in
2000.AN EU COMPANY WITHOUT AN EU TAX?
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The Ruding Committee of Independent Experts
The Ruding Committee was established in 1990 by the European Commission to address the
following questions:
1. Do the different company tax systems cause major distortions in the internal market,
particularly with regard to investment decisions and competition?
2. If such distortions arise, will market forces and tax competition eliminate the distortions, or
will Community level actions be required?
3. Should the Community concentrate on all areas of company tax, or solely on particular
areas such as company tax system, legal status, or the tax base and rates?
4. Is it necessary for the Commission to harmonise, approximate or establish a Community-
level national tax?
The Ruding Committee issued its final report in 1992. It noted that taxes appear to distort
investment allocation, and that the tax component of the cost of capital is higher on average for
both inward and outward investment than for domestic investment. Although market forces had
led to some convergence of systems, it was unlikely that these forces would eliminate existing
distortions, meaning that Community action was needed. The Committee therefore proposed a
three-pronged approach, i.e. the definition of a common tax base, encouraging transparency of
tax incentives, and eliminating distortions to cross-border investment flows. Unfortunately, the
report also proposed setting a minimum and maximum tax rate, which attracted the most
attention, and diverted the debate onto the wrong track.
The Monti package
The definite initiative to relaunch the EU tax policy debate was taken by Commissioner
Monti at the informal Ecofin Council (EU finance ministers) in Verona in April 1996.
The Commissioner started from the overall assessment that taxation on income from
labour was becoming too heavy as a result of a downward spiral in capital taxation
created by unfair tax competition between the member states to attract investment. This
was considered harmful since it led to a loss of tax revenue, distorted the Single Market
and undermined employment. The Council agreed to create an ad hoc group of special
representatives of finance ministers under the chairmanship of Commissioner Mario
Monti, known as the Taxation Policy Group, whose deliberations resulted in the Ecofin
agreement of 1 December 1997.
The Ecofin agreement includes four elements:
1. The first is a voluntary Code of Conduct in business taxation. Over a period of five
years (1977-2002), this code was intended to initially provide a standstill on special
tax regimes, and later a rollback. It defines at a very general level what constitutes
damaging tax measures. In 1999, a special ad hoc Council group published a first
list of 66 harmful tax regimes, but this report has never been discussed nor formally
endorsed by the Ecofin Council. The Code of Conduct will need to be extended or
renewed at the end of this year.
2. The second component of the deal is the commitment to ensure a minimum level of
effective taxation of savings within the EU. Subsequently, the CommissionLANNOO & LEVIN
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presented a proposal for a 20% withholding tax on interest paid to non-resident EU
citizens in May 1998. In the meantime this proposal was altered following the Feira
European Council agreement (June 2000) in a new draft, which is based upon the
exchange of information between fiscal administrations.
3. The third element is the decision to take a closer look at special tax regimes from the
point of view of the Commission’s powers in the area of state aid. Special tax
regimes can be tackled as illegal state aid policy, which the European Commission
has started to do.
10
4. Finally, the fourth element of the ECOFIN deal is the decision to resume proposals
for a corporate tax directive on interest and royalty payments between enterprises
operating on a cross-border basis. This directive was first proposed as part of the
Single Market package in 1988. A new proposal was submitted to the Council in
March 1998, but it has not fared well so far.
11
The new approach led to important progress in the area of direct taxation. Probably one
of the most significant developments is that heads of the fiscal administrations have
started to meet on a regular basis for the first time since the creation of the EU. The side
effects of such meetings cannot be underestimated, since it is the first step towards a
more elaborate system of exchange of information between fiscal administrations. The
combination of soft law (codes of conduct), hard legislation and the use of existing
Community powers in the area of state aids has brought more progress than reliance on
directives alone, which have to be adopted unanimously by the member states.
The new approach has three important drawbacks, however. First, the basic premise
underlying the whole package, i.e. that tax competition is harmful, is weak. As
mentioned above, there is no strong distinction to be drawn between harmful and
beneficial tax competition. Secondly, the package approach always requires balanced
progress. Blockage in one element can hold up progress in the others, and possibly
threaten the whole package. Thirdly, there is the heterogeneity of the package.
The assertion that tax competition is harmful finds no support in the academic literature
or in the facts, as indicated above. Taxes are not the main driving force behind foreign
investment, but only one of the factors, meaning that it is difficult to isolate taxes in an
overall process of competition for foreign investment. In general terms, tax competition
is seen as beneficial as it forces policy-makers to adjust (CEPS, 2000, pp. 16-26). The
facts also do not demonstrate that corporate tax income would have declined. While
corporate tax rates have come down, the overall level of corporate tax revenues as a
percentage of GDP has slightly increased over time in the EU. This reflects the fact that
tax reforms in EU countries, and in OECD countries in general, have combined cuts in
tax rates with measures to broaden the corporate profit base. As can be seen from Table
1, the statutory tax rates have fallen in all EU member states except one, Spain. As
                                               
10 Press Release of the European Commission, 11.07.2001, “Commission launches large scale state aid
investigation into business taxation schemes”, IP/01/982. Formally, it is difficult to consider state aid as
part of the package, because it already falls within the competence of the Commission.
 
11 Proposal for a Council directive on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty
payments made between associated companies of different member states, COM (1998) 67 final, 4 March
1998.AN EU COMPANY WITHOUT AN EU TAX?
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shown in Figure 4, corporate tax as a percentage of GDP in the industrialised countries
has experienced a slight upward trend, rising from 2.5 to 3.5%.
The package approach has probably been a clever way to achieve consensus in tax
decisions at EU level. It could rapidly become the victim of its own success, however,
with some important decisions to be taken in the coming months. The package has so
far progressed more or less in parallel in the different areas. But the situation persists in
which some countries attach more importance to the corporate tax side, others to the
savings tax element, and still others to the distortions caused by special tax regimes.
Blockage can thus still be expected, with important negotiations with third countries
still ongoing on the savings taxation directive, and the draft interest and royalty
payments directive before the Council.
There is finally the heterogeneity of the package, both in sense of the issues and the
legal instruments used. From the perspective of the business community, for example, it
is hard to understand why the draft interest and royalties directive is part of such an
uncertain and complicated process. The directive aims to correct a manifest tax
distortion in the Single Market, which should have been approved by the Single Market
1992 deadline. It is a simple correction to double taxation and tax discrimination, and
has nothing to do with a tax package against harmful tax competition. The combination
of different forms of regulatory instruments in one package has also raised problems.
The policy process for a directive is clear, but less so for a code of conduct. The latter
has been criticised for being an opaque and undemocratic way of decision-making (see
e.g. CEPS, 2000). The relationship between the code and state aid actions is also
unclear.
A second element in the drive towards more integrated tax systems is the Lisbon
process. The Lisbon European Council (March 2000) set an ambitious strategic goal for
the EU, namely “… to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better
jobs and greater social cohesion”. The reforms contemplated in the context of the Monti
package are, however, certainly insufficient to provide for this more long-term
ambition. Rather they have managed to get member states back around the table, and
solved some short-term problems. But they are not the basis for a greater convergence
of national tax systems, which would be more in conformity with the strategic goal set
in Lisbon.
The European Company Statute
In the meantime, the agreement on other important elements of the Single Market
programme, 1) the European Company Statute (ECS) and 2) the move to the application
of International Accounting Standards (IAS) for listed companies, gives a further reason
to come up with a long-term strategy. Both elements will largely facilitate the
environment for doing business in the EU.
After more than 30 years of negotiation, the member states of the EU finally endorsed
the European Company Statute on 8 October 2001. The ECS will allow companies
operating in two or more member states of the Union to work within the framework of a
single European incorporated entity. The regulation thus promises substantial savings
for European companies, and has widely been regarded as a crucial measure to completeLANNOO & LEVIN
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the Single Market and to improve the competitiveness of European companies. The
regulation will come into force three years after the final agreement.
The agreement on the SE came as a surprise, since support from business for the very
complex compromise proposals that were discussed under previous Council
Presidencies had evaporated. The final version of the regulation is less complicated and
may lead European business to consider re-incorporating as a European company. It
should simplify the organisational structure of European multinational enterprises and
thus lead to substantial cost savings and efficiency gains. It will, for example, allow
large corporations to rethink their organisational structure, and to re-organise
themselves along specific lines of activity, rather than having to incorporate on a
country-by-country basis. The legal structure could in this sense coincide much better
with the effective business configuration.
The European Company Statute (ECS)
The ECS will give companies operating in more than one member state the option of being
established as a single European company (Societas Europaea or SE) under Community law.
This will enable them to operate throughout the EU under one set of rules and with a unified
management and reporting system, rather than being subject to all the different national laws of
each member state in which they have subsidiaries. The EU regulation will allow four different
forms of creating an SE. An SE can be established:
• as a holding company promoted by public or private limited companies from at least two
different member states;
• as a joint subsidiary of companies from at least two different member states;
• through the merger of two or more existing public or private limited companies located in at
least two member states; or
• by transformation of a national company that has operated in two (or more) member states
for at least two years, without the need to dissolve the company.
The SE must have its registered office in the same member state as the head office. It can be
moved from one member state to another on the basis of a simple procedure. The SE
incorporates the possibility of one-tier and two-tier boards, in view of the fact that both are
common in the EU. The minimum capital of an SE is €120,000, in order to ensure that SMEs
have the opportunity to make use of it. Many items are left to national law, however, the most
important element being taxation.
An SE can only be created if there is consensus on the degree of worker involvement, which is
defined in a separate directive. If it proved impossible to negotiate a mutually satisfactory
arrangement, then a set of standard principles, laid down in the annexe to the directive, will
apply.
Nevertheless, there are some important drawbacks. Apart from the worker involvement
issue, which we will not develop in this context, a major problem is the frequent
referrals to national law. The SE is a framework regulation, in the sense that only some
core elements are harmonised at European level. Issues such as securities law,
bankruptcy law and taxation are not covered and left to national law. The question has
in this sense been raised whether the directive will be workable. To the extent thatAN EU COMPANY WITHOUT AN EU TAX?
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mutual recognition will work, it could become a flexible and attractive instrument. As
with other elements of the Single Market, it should give rise to competition between
jurisdictions and stimulate member states to adapt. However, member states may bring
up elements that will hinder effective use of the SE as a single European incorporation.
Taxation will certainly be the test case for the effective use of the SE. In a company law
sense, the ECS should allow an enterprise to publish a single account, to move the head
office, and thus the assets, or to consolidate losses EU-wide. However, this will imply
adaptations in tax law to make this possible. This is discussed in more detail below.
The second element highlighting the need for progress on the tax side is the move to
International Accounting Standards (IAS). Under a proposed regulation, published in
February 2001, all listed EU companies will be required to prepare consolidated
accounts in accordance with International Accounting Standards (IAS), rather than
having to comply with their home accounting standard, and an international standard.
This requirement should enter into force no later than 2005. Member states will have the
option to extend this requirement to unlisted companies and to the production of
individual company accounts. The regulation will help eliminate barriers to cross-border
trading in securities by ensuring that company accounts throughout the EU are more
transparent and can be more easily compared. This would in turn increase market
efficiency and reduce the cost of raising capital for companies, since one accounting
standard should be acceptable for the whole of the EU.
At present, accounting standards in the EU are governed by two directives, the fourth
and seventh company law directives, which were adopted in the 1970s. They deal with
annual accounts and the consolidation principles. These directives accommodate the basic
practices in place in member states, but do not establish European accounting standards, as
too many implementation options are left to the member states: 62 in the 4th directive, 50
in the 7th. Moreover, substantial differences exist between EU states with respect to the
interpretation of these provisions.
Enlargement
Tax issues have been difficult to address at an EU level for a number of reasons. If
nothing is done in terms of decision-making, enlargement will further add to these
difficulties. The enlarged Union will be more heterogeneous in terms of their members’
national interests. The new members are different in their economic structure. Their tax
systems are shaped in accordance with their stage of economic development, thus using
taxes as a means to stimulate investments and to penalise the repatriation of profits. Tax
breaks and special regimes are also widespread. A Union of 27 members will cripple the
EU’s decision-making process unless the European Convention or another forum
manages to simplify it. All this means that the EU, while reaping the substantial benefits
of enlargement in numerous areas, will be in a worse position to tackle tax issues.
***
Important elements will thus be in place to enable companies to work in the EU as a
truly Single Market. Enlargement may, however, consume a substantial amount of the
EU’s energy for an extended period of time. There is thus a pre-enlargement “window
of opportunity” to expand and advance the debate on tax measures beyond the issues
that are currently under discussion as part of the tax package to seek a long-termLANNOO & LEVIN
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solution for European business. The implications of this opportunity are presented in the
next section.
II. THE IDEAL CORPORATE TAX SCENARIO FOR THE EU
Let it be clear from the beginning, the ideal scenario for the EU is not a single corporate
tax rate. The EU is a federation of sovereign states, which have, in the Treaty of the EU,
agreed to form an “ever-closer Union”. Integration started with different sectors of the
economy, and has recently been pursued in other areas such as foreign and security
policy. The basis of economic integration remains anchored, however, in the economics
of fiscal federalism and the politics of subsidiarity. Local provision of locally efficient
levels of public goods will always ensure that welfare provision is at least as high or
higher than would be the case under central provision at a single uniform level. In
policy terms, things should not be done at a higher political level if they can be done
more efficiently at a lower level. An important implication of this model is regulatory
and jurisdictional competition: what states have not agreed to do in common will be
subject to competition. This is a cornerstone of the Single Market, but it is also its
Achilles heel, since member states may not accept cross-border trade on the grounds
that the standards applied in other member state are not equivalent – they will argue
there is unlawful competition.
The theories of fiscal federalism and subsidiarity also apply to tax policy. Following the
Leviathan State of public choice theory, decentralised taxation enhances the chance that
levels of regulation and public services provision are matched with citizen’s
preferences. Furthermore, it is a useful protective device against over-taxation and
“greediness” by the state. Decentralised taxation triggers interstate competition, which
keeps taxes in line. Moreover, states have a different mix in factors of production,
which they need to exploit in attracting foreign direct investment, which is influenced
by the geographical location, the composition of the population, the level of education
of the workforce, etc. States should thus be in a position to exploit these differences,
which should also be apparent in their tax system. This is of great importance in a
European context, where levels of economic development and the mix of production
factors still differ importantly.
At this point, the discussion launched by Commissioner Monti comes into play. The
decentralisation can be such that it creates distortions in economic behaviour. Whereas
capital in the EU is mobile, labour is not, or much less so. Thus, worker migration
cannot respond to differences in wage levels. According to the Commission’s analysis,
taxes on capital income have declined as a result of this competitive process, which has
been recuperated through increased taxation of labour. This has led to higher real
wages, and higher unemployment. However, although the latter assumption seems to be
correct according to certain sources (see e.g. Daveri and Tabellini, 2000), the literature
is less conclusive on the former. Tax competition seems to have beneficial effects, and
not only harmful consequences. A single answer cannot be given (CEPS, 2000; Bratton
and McCahery, 2001).
This may change in the future. As member states’ economic policies become more
similar and economic interconnections between them increase in number and depth,
these policies (particularly taxing and spending policies) will cause more fiscal
externalities. The allocation of capital will become more ineffective, thereby
highlighting the negative distributional consequences of tax competition. The Code ofAN EU COMPANY WITHOUT AN EU TAX?
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Conduct is a first step in tackling these externalities but it is vulnerable to challenge.
The link with an empirically verifiable set of justifying conditions is tenuous (Bratton
and McCahery, 2001). The Code, and the actions undertaken by the European
Commission against fiscal state aid, have been useful in contributing to a process that
will eliminate distortive preferential measures. The Code is not sufficient, however, as it
will not by itself lead to a more coordinated regime in the EU.
1. The ideal long-term scenario
Given these assumptions, the ideal tax scenario for the EU is one in which a form of
basic harmonisation is undertaken, in line with the foundations of the Single Market. So
far, the harmonisation undertaken at EU level, although embryonic, has tackled tax
obstacles. In a second phase, one should try to shape the market, that is, to devise
policies aimed at governing or directing the market. An EU corporate income tax
(EUCIT) at a uniform rate is not considered, since it is difficult to reconcile with the
basics of economic and political federalism. What the Single Market needs is a common
corporate tax base, a single standard on the basis of which corporate profits would be
taxed, as exists at national level in most member states. To a significant extent this
would eliminate competition between the member states for the tax base. Member states
would still be able to compete, however, on the basis of differences in the tax rate.
A common corporate tax base involves agreement on three principal elements:
• A common method of measuring corporate profits;
• Agreement on the business entity (company/group) to be used for the purposes of
that measurement; and
• Agreement on a uniform formula for splitting corporate profits between the member
states (the formula apportionment – see box below).
This will not be easy to achieve. Firstly, the legal basis to harmonise corporate taxes in
the EU Treaty is much less evident than it is for turnover taxes (VAT). Art 93 of the EU
Treaty requires member states to harmonise legislation regarding turnover taxes,
whereas there is no equivalent for corporate taxes. Secondly, a corporate tax base is not
as objectively verifiable as other forms of taxes. The measurement of corporate tax
profits depends only peripherally on cash transactions. More importantly, it depends in
practical terms upon the subjective judgements of accountants in arriving at commercial
accounting profits and on the different adjustments that countries make to profits
thereby ascertained. In comparison, the tax base for VAT is objectively verifiable,
which has allowed the EU to progress relatively easily in this area, although there
remain differences in the VAT rates among the member states (CEPS, 2001).
 Already the first step, a common method for measuring tax profits, is a huge task. It
raises the question of how profits are measured and which accounting standard is used.
Generally speaking, two traditions exist in the EU. Accounting standards in some
countries are driven by the needs of financial markets, and agreed upon by standard-
setters, and in others, they are primarily driven by law – the former represented mainly by
English-speaking states and the latter by continental European countries. In the former,
accounts are expected to convey information of an adequate quality, in accordance with the
accepted standards and practices developed by the accounting profession. In the latter, it is
based on compliance with statutory requirements. Tax authorities have retained a strongLANNOO & LEVIN
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influence on the accounting regulation processes in those countries, as national law states
that taxable profit should be close to the profit reported in individual financial statements.
What is formula apportionment?
Under formula apportionment, a taxable profit of a company in a certain state is apportioned by
applying a certain formula to the state(s) where the profit was realised. Rather than having to
file tax accounts in the different states of a federation, and to apply complex transfer pricing
rules for intra-company transactions, a company files only a single account and pays a single
tax, which is distributed according to a certain share over the states where the profit was
realised. The formula attaches a specific weight to factors such as assets, sales and payroll in the
apportionment of profits. A host of studies exists, mainly focused on the US, which analyse
changes in the weights of the different factors and the implications for employment and
investment (see Weiner, 1999, for a survey of the literature).
The US and Canada have been using the apportionment method and the unitary tax method for
nearly 100 and 50 years, respectively. The US system has been widely analysed, but it is not an
example of the best functioning and most uncontroversial system available. While the US
federal tax base is the standard, the US states vary in their tax rates, formulas and definitions.
Canada is probably a more appropriate example. All the provinces adopted the same two-factor
formula and have the same tax base, in exchange for the federal government incurring all of the
administrative costs associated with collecting the provincial tax. This system has proven
remarkably stable, and may provide the best model for the EU.
 
 The acceptance of International Accounting Standards (IAS) as the standard for all listed
companies in the EU does not immediately change this situation. It has been suggested to
use the IAS as a basis for taxing profits, but this has not been welcomed by the accounting
profession, which has expressed concern that it will have to take tax matters into
consideration as well, not only pure accounting issues. Nevertheless, it has been argued
that work should be started to recalculate taxable profits on certain critical items, such as
depreciation, stocks, equity stakes on other companies, allowances for various risks and
other reserves, in order to compare the results obtained under the assumptions of both the
IAS and the national accounting standard. Based on the results, the tax bases could be
brought closer (Micossi, 2001).
 The second step, the definition of a group, is also bound to raise controversy and
disagreement, as there is no clear-cut way to define the entities/boundaries for tax
purposes. The simplest way to define a unitary business would be to combine all
affiliates that exceeded a certain threshold, say 50%. This idea is appealing primarily for
its administrative simplicity, but it may be circumvented easily. It may lead companies
to split up their business to avoid EU taxation. They would thus be arranging their
corporate structure for tax, rather than business purposes, an action that is not consistent
with the goals of reforming EU company taxation. The problems experienced with
defining group structures in discussions on draft EU company law or financial
regulation directives indicate that these are not easy issues to tackle.
A third step from here would be even more difficult. Once profits have been determined
according to a common tax base for a certain company group, they should be divided
amongst the member states, using a uniform formula, for taxation at the local rate of theAN EU COMPANY WITHOUT AN EU TAX?
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member state in question. The introduction of formula apportionment would thus
require a very high degree of cooperation and exchange of information among fiscal
authorities in the member states. This means that member states will have to give up
their absolute sovereignty in tax matters, since a tax authority of one member state
should be allowed to control the accounts of a company incorporated in another member
state, if it has questions of the taxable profit apportioned.
2. An alternative medium-term scenario
Faced with these problems, the question thus emerges what strategy should be followed
to move in the direction of a common tax base. Two ideas were recently put forward by
a CEPS Task Force on EU Corporate Tax Reform.
12 The first is the Home State
Taxation (HST) idea, the second an Optional System of Common Base Taxation
(Optional CBT).
Optional Common Base Taxation (Optional CBT)
Under this model, an Optional Common Tax Base would be derived from international
accounting standards, a synthesis of taxation rules of the member states, or a
combination of both approaches. Accordingly, the issues to be agreed in arriving at an
Optional CBT seem no different from those for a non-optional or mandatory common
base. Under Optional CBT, however, corporate entities within Europe would be allowed
the choice between the common tax base and the corporate tax base (if different)
defined in each member state. The advantage of this parallel approach is that member
states should be more inclined to agree a common tax base than if they were seeking to
define a common tax base to replace their domestic tax systems. member states will also
retain sovereignty over their domestic tax base, and business will not be faced with the
burden of having to change their tax declarations.
Home State Taxation (HST)
Under HST, the taxable base is the taxable profits of the entity as determined under the
rules of the entity’s home state. Thus, an entity uses one measure of taxable profits only,
even though every entity can in theory at the outset select between 15 different methods
of measuring taxable profits. Although each tax system differs in its detail (at the outset
at least), HST envisages that the different systems will produce substantially similar
results of taxable profits over time. This is because each member state’s system would
conform to agreed parameters – effectively a common corporate tax model – and
member states would not be free to change their system unilaterally so as to no longer
conform to that model.
Both approaches, however, still require member states to agree on a formula to
apportion profits. Optional CBT also requires member states to agree on a definition of
a group, whereas HST offers the possibility to extend the group definition under each
member state’s domestic legislation, subject to agreement on some common principles.
Neither is the ideal solution for Europe, however. Rather they should be seen as
practical steps towards a system that is consistent with the Single Market. According to
the CEPS Task Force on EU Corporate Tax Reform (CEPS, 2001), the real difference
                                               
12 Chaired by Malcolm Gammie, barrister at the Chambers of Lord Grabiner, QC; see CEPS (2001).LANNOO & LEVIN
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between HST and a common base lies solely in their approach to implementing a
common objective. The former emphasises mutual recognition at a Community level of
similar (but not identical) domestic measures. The latter emphasises the adoption at the
domestic level of any one of several approaches that have been agreed at Community
level to be similar. Thus, the difference between both systems is more apparent than
real, since the more member state’s corporate tax systems diverge, the more difficult it
is to think of adopting HST or agreeing a common base. Conversely, the more they
converge, the easier it is both to contemplate HST and to envisage reaching agreement
on a common base.
3. The short- to medium-term scenario
One of the most significant forces in shaping tax developments over the next five years
is likely to be the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Over the last few years, the Court
has become increasingly active in striking down a number of tax measures as
incompatible with the Single Market. ECJ action is not sufficient, however, as it is too
piecemeal and ad hoc, and therefore unlikely to lead to a coherent overall result. A
pragmatic scenario should therefore be outlined to arrive at more coordination of
corporate tax policies in the member states. It consists of different steps going beyond
the strategy adopted by the Ecofin Council in December 1997. In view of the difficulties
in harmonising corporate taxation in the EU, it can be assumed that this might take at
least five to ten years. This is at the limit if the EU wants to respect the 2010 target it set
itself at the Lisbon European Council in March 2000. EU action on the points below is
therefore urgently needed:
1. A first step would be to streamline the implementation of the current tax directives
(merger and parent/subsidiary directives), and to adapt them to make them also
applicable to the Societas Europaea.
2. In a second step, possibly in combination with step one, the merger directive should
be expanded to take full account of the implications of the European Company
Statute. This should broaden its scope to ease the restructuring of corporations and
the transfer of assets between corporations in the EU. A company should not be
penalised for liquidation of a subsidiary if it serves to bring the assets of the
liquefied company into another corporation incorporated in another member state.
Also cross-border loss-compensation should be considered in this context;
3. Ensure that a coordinated approach prevails in the attitude of the member states
towards the implementation of the European Company Statute. Some member states
have hinted at the possibility of making the SE more attractive on their territory by
granting it a special favourable tax regime. This would clearly go against the spirit
of the ECS.
4. Complete coverage and harmonisation of intra-EU terms of bilateral tax treaties,
following as closely as possible the OECD Model Convention. This should in a
second step lead to a single common EU-rest of the world tax treaty model.
5. Set process into motion for moving towards a common corporate tax base through
Home State Taxation or Optional Common Base Taxation. A first step could be to
study the effects of harmonisation of certain critical items in companies’ balanceAN EU COMPANY WITHOUT AN EU TAX?
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sheets, such as depreciation, stocks, reserves and provisions, which are a major
source of divergence in profit determination for tax purposes.
Overall, the appropriate policy mix at EU level should focus on both long-term and
short-term measures. An appropriate comparison can be made with the current attempts
to forge a seamless single financial market in the EU. In order to root out the current
obstacles to a Single Market, the European Commission drew up a Financial Services
Action Plan (FSAP) in 1998. The FSAP contains 42 legislative measures grouped in
four different areas: wholesale finance, retail finance, supervisory arrangements and
wider conditions for financial integration (e.g. corporate governance and certain tax
issues). The FSAP detailed the legislative measures and provided a roadmap with clear
priorities and deadlines for each and every proposal. Progress of the FSAP is reviewed
once every six months (progress reports are published by the European Commission).
A similar plan should be drawn up for the area of corporate tax policy. A rough version
is outlined in Table 3 below.
Corporate Tax Action Plan
Timing Proposal Advantages Deadline
Long-term Common Tax Base Transparency
Efficiency
Effectiveness
Medium-term Home State Taxation Politically feasible
Simplification compared to status
quo
2010
Lisbon
target
Optional Common Base
Taxation
Politically feasible
Deliberate step to a Common Tax
Base
2010
Lisbon
target
Short-term Adapt parent/subsidiary and
merger directives to existence
of ECS
Include SEs in the list of applicable
entities
2003
Improve implementation of
current directives
Make effects more visible 2003
Expand scope of merger
directive
Ease cross-border restructuring
(transfer of assets, cross-border loss
compensation)
2003
Harmonise intra-EU terms of
tax treaties in the EU, and
move to common EU-rest of
world model
Adapts tax treaties to reality of the
EU and reduces tax planning.
2005
Immediate Coordinate implementation of
the ECS
Ensure that the benefits of the ECS
materialise
Now
Adoption of the draft
interest/royalty directive
Harmonise tax treatment of
transfers between associated
companies
Now
Ratification of the
prolongation of the
Arbitration Convention
Orderly resolution of disputes in the
area of transfer pricing
Now
Prolongation of the Code of
Conduct beyond 2002
Ensure continuation of attempts to
dismantle harmful tax practices
NowLANNOO & LEVIN
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III. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF MORE TAX COORDINATION
As outlined above, the short- and medium-term aim for EU policy-making should
consist of a more coordinated tax regime, with Home State Taxation (HST) or optional
Common Base Taxation (CBT) as medium-term objectives, and some form of
apportionment of taxable profit among member states. A single EU tax regime with a
single tax base would offer several positive aspects (e.g. neutrality and simplicity), but it
is still a long-term option.
The cost-benefit analysis follows from this assessment, and will thus have to be judged
in that perspective. Starting from the view that some degree of tax competition is
beneficial, HST and optional CBT are beneficial as both systems retain some
“competitive” aspects. However, there will also be some drawbacks of a HST or
optional CBT. The cost of running 15 (or more) different tax systems will have declined
for private business, while it will increase for governments, which will have to learn to
live with the exchange of information and formula apportionment. The experience of
the Canadian provinces suggests that a simple system will need to be designed, which is
no easy task in the context of the EU decision-making process.
It may be surprising, but there has so far been very little if any empirical research on the
effects of more tax coordination or harmonisation for the Single Market. Overall, it is
assumed that the fact of having to work with many different tax systems in the EU is
costly. The 1987 Cecchini Report on the cost of non-Europe did not really quantify the
costs of having different tax regimes in the EU. It described differences in corporate tax
regimes as one of the many barriers to the Single Market, and estimated very roughly
that this would amount to 10-30% of the costs of companies. The Ruding Report (1992)
noticed a convergence in the corporate tax component of the average cost of capital
across member states, but attributed this to downward convergence of interest and
inflation rates, rather than deliberate action on the part of the authorities.
A 1992 CEPS report on corporate tax harmonisation saw the gains from a greater degree
of convergence of corporate tax regimes coming partly from administrative simplicity
and partly from organisational and financial restructuring. Secondly, it expected that
gains from achieving greater Capital Import Neutrality (CIN), defined as no difference
in the tax on similar companies in a particular country and Capital Export Neutrality
(CEN), in which there is no difference in the tax on the same investment located in
different countries, would be potentially more important. However, full CIN or CEN
would not be required, since the corporate tax rate must reflect traditional distortions in
the choice of assets and finance, and must not encourage or discourage economic
activity where inappropriate. A good corporate tax structure in this context is one that
does not distort economic behaviour and is tax neutral. This can best be seen by
considering the investment decision of firms in the absence of corporate taxes. They
would invest if the rate of return on investment were sufficient to provide financiers
with a reasonable return on their capital, after covering all expenses, including
depreciation of assets. A corporate tax that only taxed profits over and above the profits
required to give financiers a reasonable return and that allowed for depreciation of
assets at true rates would be a neutral tax. This is theory, however, as many elements
distort this neutral situation. Deduction costs for investments, for example, are either too
small or too large, nominal depreciation rates can differ systematically from real rates,
and are often used as a hidden incentive (fiscal state aid), etc.AN EU COMPANY WITHOUT AN EU TAX?
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This section starts by assessing the overall effects of tax base harmonisation. It then
continues by assessing the effects in five key areas: competitiveness of the tax system,
the European Company Statute, labour markets, public finance and capital markets.
1. Overall effects of tax base harmonisation
The harmonisation of the tax base is likely to have both positive and negative effects on
the tax burden faced by companies. No research exists, however, on the quantitative
benefits from tax base harmonisation. Indeed, the issue is very complex, involving both
static and dynamic effects. This section will take as its point of departure the concerns
detailed above and assess how a common base would alleviate those concerns.
Positive effects
There are certain attributes of an ideal tax system. It should be fair and equitable. It
should be economically efficient and neutral, i.e. not distort investment decisions. It
should be simple and transparent, the rules should be certain and well known. Finally, it
should improve economic welfare. A single consolidated corporate tax base would bring
the EU’s currently fragmented tax systems closer to the ideal.
• Economic efficiency
A single tax base would reduce the current differences in treatment of taxable profits
between the member states. As such, it would ensure a fairer and more equitable
treatment of companies all over the EU. For example, it would eliminate the current
problem of not being able to offset losses across borders in the EU.
A single tax base would eliminate the possibility of competing for tax bases. The
location of investment is currently often responding to the special measures that states
set up to attract companies. Therefore, investments are often tax-driven instead of cost-
driven, which is unproductive. A single tax base would increase tax neutrality and make
the rationale of an investment location decision more transparent. Moreover, firms are
currently engaged in the complex, costly and, from a social welfare point of view
unproductive activity of calculating transfer prices. A single tax base within the EU
would largely remove the need to engage in this company activity within Europe. It
would remain for third countries, however.
13
• Administrative simplicity and transparency
A single tax base will reduce the number of tax systems from 15 to one, with
maintenance of different tax rates, of course. It will therefore hugely increase simplicity
and transparency, as the taxable profits will be calculated in the same way all over the
EU. It will thus reduce compliance and administration costs. Compliance costs are
difficult to estimate, but may be as much as 2 to 4% of total tax revenues.
14 In 1992,
85% of some 965 companies in the EU and EEA countries surveyed by the Ruding
Committee estimated compliance costs at 3% of a company’s total income, and there is
some evidence that the compliance cost ratio is higher for foreign income than for
                                               
13 Tax-planning opportunities may not disappear completely under the new system. Instead of planning
according to rates, however, companies may use the formula in order to minimise their tax burden.
14 European Commission (2001, Annex II, p. 74) lists the results of some country surveys of compliance
costs.LANNOO & LEVIN
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domestic income.
15 Several surveys indicate that compliance costs are especially
burdensome for SMEs, which often need to rely on outside professional assistance to
comply with their tax declarations.
A numerical example to highlight the size of these costs may be useful. As such
exercises are fraught with methodological problems, the figures should be seen as
purely indicative.
Table 4. The size of the compliance cost, € million
Corporate tax revenues
a Cost of compliance (2%)
b Cost of compliance (4%)
b
BE 8,690 173.8 347.6
DK 4,359 87.2 174.4
DE 30,979 619.6 1,239
ES 12,936 258.7 517.4
GR 2,122 42.4 84.9
FR 34,733 694.7 1,389
IE 2,618 52.4 104.7
IT 31,864 637.3 1,274
LU 1,336 26.7 53.4
NL 15,189 303.8 607.6
AU 4,032 80.6 161.3
PT 3,866 77.3 154.6
FI 4,769 95.4 190.8
SE 6,243 124.9 249.7
UK 51,021 1,020 2,040
EU15 214,764 4,295 8,590
a As reported  in OECD (2000, code 1200).
b Percentages based on European Commission (2001).
The single base will also reduce the costs of administering the tax system. Currently tax
administrations have to verify foreign source income, be aware of the tax systems in
other EU member states and monitor the transfer pricing system. With a single tax base,
those costs will disappear for intra-EU business. On the other hand, running  an
apportionment system may be burdensome for administrations, as is evident from the
US experience. A single tax base would also enhance legal certainty in tax matters, as
the tax base would be codified at EU level.
• Effectiveness and economic welfare
It is very difficult to assess what effects the current system will have on economic
welfare and effectiveness (i.e. the ability to achieve the stated objectives of the
Community). Over time a single base is likely to decrease the effective tax and
administrative burden faced by companies and may decrease the cost of capital. In that
sense, it will contribute to the target set by the Lisbon Council of making EU economies
                                               
15 European Commission (2001, pp. 74-77).AN EU COMPANY WITHOUT AN EU TAX?
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more competitive. Economic analysis suggests, however, that there is a difference
between the static and immediate effects of the imposition of a single base and the more
long-term and dynamic effects.
As mentioned above, effective tax rates are a function of nominal tax rates and the tax
base. Normally, countries with high nominal rates compensate by having a narrow base,
and vice-versa. Research by the European Commission shows that the initial effect of
tax base harmonisation is an increase in the divergence of effective tax rates and an
increase in the effective tax burden faced by companies.
16 This reflects the fact that if
the tax base is harmonised in an expansive way but tax rates remain national, ceteris
paribus, the effective tax rate will increase.
Over time the effect is likely to be different. The increased divergence and level of EU
corporate taxes may trigger a process of convergence, as companies arbitrage away this
price difference. As nominal rates are also likely to decrease (unless there is a political
decision to harmonise at the upper end), the overall economic effect of tax base
harmonisation is highly complex to assess. Without political intervention, base
harmonisation is likely to lead to rate decreases and thus a lowering of the effective tax
burden. With political intervention, the burden is likely to remain stable or increase.
Potential drawbacks
A single tax base thus engenders substantial benefits for companies. There are certain
drawbacks as well, however. First, there will be less potential for tax planning, and
companies may thus find it more difficult to minimise their taxes. It is also uncertain
how a single tax base will affect the revenues of governments. Even though the
Commission’s results above suggest that the initial result of a harmonised tax base may
be an increase in the effective tax rates of companies, the impact differs from one
country to another. Moreover, base harmonisation is likely to lead to a convergence of
nominal rates. The direction this convergence takes (upper or lower end) determines the
eventual impact on government revenue. Essentially, fiscal authorities are faced with
increasing costs, as they have to engage in cross-border enquiries and audits. These and
other administrative issues therefore need to be well researched and calculated.
In sum, a single tax base will be fairer, more efficient, simple and transparent. It is
likely to have a positive effect on effectiveness and economic welfare. The final
outcome depends on the forces unleashed by the interplay of the processes of base
harmonisation and rate convergence. The impact of these processes on tax burden and
tax revenues ultimately depends on choices made by policy-makers. Since the European
economies will continue to differ in factors of production and in attractiveness for
foreign investment, policy-makers will continue to apply different tax rates, and
European countries will differ in the overall composition of tax revenues.
The effect of tax harmonisation is further discussed in four areas: competitiveness, legal
structures, labour and capital markets.
                                               
16 European Commission (2001, p. 171) finds that the standard deviation increased from 10.4 to 12.4.LANNOO & LEVIN
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2. Tax reforms and competitiveness of European industry
As indicated above, there exists no empirical quantification of the cost of not having a
more harmonised European tax system and of its impact on the competitiveness of
European enterprises. The evidence is based on the numerous obstacles that inhibit
cross-border business. Companies working in the EU are faced with 15 widely different
sets of rules, which have developed under different circumstances. This complex of
rules entails substantial compliance costs for business. The importance of these
variations are difficult to document systematically since almost every country and every
instrument is a special case, and there is virtually no rule without an exception. A few
examples (see below) will suffice, however, to illustrate the significance of these
differences in tax regimes.
17
• Loss-compensation is only available to differing degrees on a cross-border basis,
depending on the definition of “loss” in national law, the legal form of the business
in the host country and the existence of double taxation treaties. On a national basis,
losses in branches can fully be carried forward and set off against future profits.
According to a survey by the Federation of Swedish Industries, the difficulty in
setting off these losses on a cross-border basis leads in more than half of the cases to
permanent double taxation.
18
• Transfer pricing rules for attributing company profits between countries, while
being based on OECD guidelines and principles, leave considerable room for
different uses and interpretation by member states. A number of examples can be
given where member states apply the guidelines differently. Furthermore, a number
of member states have not issued their own statement of practice on the
implementation of the guidelines.
• Taxation treaties exist to remedy double taxation. However, the network of treaties
is incomplete and insufficient in scope. Not all EU member states have tax treaties
with each other, the scope differs and the rates applicable are not consistently
applied across countries.
• Depreciation systems differ profoundly for the different items (machinery and
buildings) as well in the method of depreciation used (straight or declining over
time) and in the rates applied. Not one system is equal to another in the EU.
19
These are only a few examples from the tax jungle which companies face when working
on a cross-border basis in Europe. The wide variation between member states leads to a
situation where taxes are an important reason behind a location decision. Normally, the
location of investment should be dependent upon the overall cost, not only the tax cost.
If European companies tend to locate according to tax cost, the overall profitability of
European companies may be hampered, which will have welfare effects. If this is the
case, as is quite likely, the overall competitiveness of European companies is at risk.
The recent Commission study analysed effective levels of company taxation in the EU,
and found differences in the magnitude of 37 percentage points in case of a marginal
                                               
17 Examples are largely drawn from European Commission (2001, Part III, pp. 223-304).
18 European Commission (2001, p. 252).
19 European Parliament (2000, p. 64).AN EU COMPANY WITHOUT AN EU TAX?
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investment (where the post-tax return rate just equals the alternative market interest
rate), and around 30 percentage points for more profitable investments.
20 These
differences imply large inefficiencies in the allocation of resources.
Overall, the key problems can be summarised as follows:
• Tax systems have a enormous bias towards domestic investment and disadvantage
foreign investment and income.
• Within European-wide group structures, profits have to be allocated on an arm’s-
length basis, which gives rise to problems of transferring income streams and
possible double taxation.
• Cross-border restructuring of business is hampered because capital gains and
transfer taxes are often prohibitively high, and because of the limited availability of
loss-compensation. If a company in a restructuring process is closed down and its
assets are transferred to a company in another member state, the assets are taxed at a
dissuasive rate.
• The network of bilateral taxation treaties is no longer adapted to the level of market
integration in the EU. With n being the number of member states of the EU, n(n-1)
or 210 different modalities of compliance can theoretically be needed with tax
treaties in the EU. It is obvious that such a framework is no longer consistent with
the nature and level of European integration. Moreover, tax credits often take years
to be paid.
Some of the problems have been addressed in the parent-subsidiary and merger
directives, but the scope of these directives was too narrow, and their implementation in
the member states was distorted because of the wide differences in tax systems. Also the
Arbitration Convention has been a useful tool to settle disputes between firms and tax
authorities, but it contains numerous technical difficulties and provisions that are
dissuasive to companies.
21 Some other issues have been addressed by the European
Commission, but they are still before the EU Council (draft interest and royalty
payments directive), or had to be withdrawn (cross-border compensation of losses).
Recent rulings of the European Court of Justice have also had a positive effect in
reducing tax obstacles. In the AMID case, for example, the Court ruled that the
impossibility to compensate losses on a cross-border basis in the EU is in violation of
the EU Treaty, since it hinders the freedom of establishment.
22 However, Court rulings
                                               
20 European Commission (2001, p. 4).
21 The Arbitration Convention formally expired in 2000, and its extension must still be ratified by several
member states.
22 The ECJ has analysed cross-border losses and taxation on a number of occasions. In the case of AMID
vs. the Belgian state (C-141/99), the Court found that Belgium treated companies differently for tax
purposes depending on whether the company had an establishment outside the country or not. AMID was
forced to set off the losses of its Belgian head office against the profits of its Luxembourg permanent
establishment although these profits were exempt from tax in Belgium under a double tax agreement. As
a result, AMID Belgium could not set off its losses against its Belgian profits. Had AMID had its
permanent establishment in Belgium, however, it would have been able to offset its losses. The Court
found that there was no objective difference motivating this difference in treatment and that therefore this
amounted to discrimination and hindrance to the freedom of establishment under Article 52 of the EC
Treaty. For further details see European Commission (2001, p. 252).LANNOO & LEVIN
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do not necessarily lead to a more European tax system, as the adjustments made at
national level in response to these rulings will not be coordinated. The increasing
number of cases on taxes brought before the ECJ is an argument in itself for more tax
coordination.
In the longer term, a single tax base and an EU-wide definition of group of companies
are the only means to significantly reduce these compliance costs. They should
eliminate problems related to EU-wide allocation of profits, transfer pricing and double
taxation, reduce discriminatory situations and ease European-wide restructuring.
Multinational firms will no longer need to almost artificially identify the geographical
location of their profits, which by the same token will help them to think more
“European”.
There is a real danger, however, that a coordinated effort at European level to harmonise
tax bases will lead certain companies to shift profits and investments outside the EU, as
the scope for shifting profits in the EU is reduced. However, the scope for tax
competition will be limited, since 1) most states of Central and Eastern Europe will
soon become members of the European Union, and will thus apply the same standards;
2) the incentive to conclude comprehensive bilateral agreements with third countries
will be enhanced, as is being discussed in the area of savings taxation, and 3) tax rates
will not be harmonised, meaning that there will remain scope for competition between
countries within the EU.
3. Tax reform and legal structures of doing business
A single European tax base would give real life to the European Company Statute.
Today, companies are required to incorporate separately in the EU member states
because of tax, social and legal reasons. On the legal side, the ECS is the first act of
truly European company law, allowing for a single incorporation, but if this is not
accompanied by measures on the tax side that allow for single reporting, e.g. single
profit filing, the Statute will not be of much use.
The non-existence of European company law has so far limited the possibility for firms
to take full benefit of the two existing EU tax directives, most importantly for the
merger directive. As from October 2004, when the ECS comes into force, cross-border
mergers will be considerably eased, and a wave of company restructuring can be
expected to happen. A prerequisite, however, is that the existing two directives are first
updated to take the ECS into account, and second, that the scope of the merger is
expanded. In this sense, structures of incorporation can be expected to be less driven by
tax considerations in the future.
The implementation of the worker involvement procedures, contained in a separate
directive, will be crucial for the success of the ECS. An SE can only be constituted if
                                                                                                                                         
See also Centros Ltd vs. Danish state (C-212/97). While not directly applicable, as it deals with company
formation rules in general and capital requirement rules in particular, it may have analogous effects in the
field of taxation. The ECJ ruled that Denmark broke EU law when it refused to allow Centros Ltd to
register a branch in Denmark. Centros, run by Danish citizens, had registered its office in the UK but
intended to carry out all its activities in the Danish branch. The benefit for Centros would be to escape the
capital requirements imposed by Denmark and instead register under the UK’s more lenient regime,
which required an initial capitalisation of only £100).AN EU COMPANY WITHOUT AN EU TAX?
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some form of worker involvement is instituted, unless workers waive these rights. A
substantive assessment of these procedures is needed to judge whether the SE will be
usable. A comparison can be made with the use of Workers Councils directive.
4. Tax reform and EU labour markets
The evidence of the lack of tax coordination is probably the clearest for European
labour markets. This one factor was the principal reason behind the European
Commission’s decision to initiate action on harmful tax competition in 1996. While the
effective tax rate on retained corporate income has remained constant over the last
decade, the increase in the overall tax burden has been shifted towards these more
immobile factors of production. However, this does not necessarily mean that more tax
coordination would lead to more employment. Governments will first need to make sure
that increases in government expenditure are no longer passed on to labour. Secondly,
to realise a possible positive effect on employment, the tax burden on labour will have
to be decreased, which will need to be recouped elsewhere in the tax system, or be
compensated through less government spending. Neither step is easy.
Recent research has shown a link between the cost of labour and unemployment. Faced
with growing competition for one of the more mobile factors of competition, capital,
governments have shifted the rising cost of the generous European welfare states,
essentially in pension expenditures, onto the least mobile factor of production, labour.
This has contributed to higher unemployment, slower growth and investment (Daveri
and Tabellini, 2000).
A single corporate tax base and formula apportionment could reduce the pressure to
recoup the growing costs of Europe’s welfare states from labour, as those costs would
then be more transparent. It is by no means guaranteed, however, that this would lead to
higher revenues from corporate taxes. In any case, this should also not stop
governments from reforming Europe’s welfare state. The apportionment system will
also need to be designed in a flexible way to take account of the differences in the cost
of labour in the EU. Moreover, the cost of compensation will need to be defined
carefully, to include all the different factors affecting payroll costs.
5. Tax reform and capital markets
Capital markets are global, and not directly affected by changes in the corporate tax
system. Indirectly European capital markets would certainly benefit from a more
harmonised tax system. The use of International Accounting Standards for EU listed
companies from 2005 onwards will also highlight the lack of harmonisation on the
corporate tax side. Comparability of corporate accounts will be further enhanced if
corporate profits would be measured in the same way across countries, and the work of
financial analysts would be eased. Contrary to what may be expected, analysts are not
served by profits calculated under different taxable bases, and will not bother to re-
calculate how the profits would have looked under another system. Profits may thus look
more or less attractive to a potential investor if they were calculated under another system,
but since this work is so complicated, the job is not undertaken, and the stock may not be
properly priced. Hence, international portfolio diversification is constrained and the
willingness to invest abroad is significantly reduced. Tax harmonisation thus also affects
the integration and competitiveness of European capital markets.LANNOO & LEVIN
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III. CONCLUSION
The way corporate taxation is currently organised in the EU is both complex and costly.
As European integration advances, the complexity and costs increase and become more
striking. Numerous attempts have been made to reduce the complexity, but most of
them have failed. This is regrettable, as the benefits to be reaped from a more
coordinated corporate tax regime are significant.
A number of recent developments provide a window of opportunity to remedy this
situation and to devise a strategy to arrive at a more coordinated EU tax system.
1. A follow-up to the Monti tax package is needed. The package helped in providing a
new impetus to tax coordination in the EU and in reducing tax obstacles. A positive
integration strategy is now needed to set a new target.
2. Taxes form an important component of the ambitious agenda agreed in Lisbon in
2000 to make the EU more competitive. If the EU is serious about the Lisbon
process, it needs to set a timetable for EU corporate tax reform as well.
3. The European Company Statute opens new opportunities for European business, but
demands a tax leg to be really attractive.
The European Convention could give the EU the means to advance more rapidly, if
qualified majority voting can be extended to the area of corporate taxation as well. This
is almost a conditio sine qua non, as all tax matters will otherwise be relegated to a
virtual standstill after enlargement, with an EU of 27 or more member states.AN EU COMPANY WITHOUT AN EU TAX?
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